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In virtually all states, statutes define sodomy, "crimes
against nature," and other sexually related activities as
major felonies. Their existence has often been the object of
ridicule and scorn. Read literally, these statutes impose
severe criminal penalties on any homosexual activity,
regardless of the setting, as well as a variety of sexual
practices between heterosexuals, married or not. They are
sometimes referenced in the statutes only in the most
Victorian terms, and sometimes listed in what would appear
to be unnecessary detail. The language of some state statutes
allows criminal courts almost limitless discretion to interpret
what is feloniously "unnatural" or "unspeakable."'
Surely these statutes, along with the so-called "Blue
Laws," statutory bans on cohabitation, proscriptions on
blasphemy, and the like-a review of the criminal code in
any jurisdiction will provide no end of surprising but com-
parable examples2-are relics of an earlier era, to be largely
ignored in contemporary society. But do these statutes
remain on the books only because they are unenforced or
unenforceable under modern constitutional notions of pri-
vacy?
In a number of states, these statutes have, in fact, been
limited in their scope. Various courts have ruled that the
sodomy legislation does not apply in their jurisdiction to
activities among consenting adults, that activities in the
privacy of the home are protected by the Constitution, or
that sexual conduct between married persons cannot be
regulated by such legislation.3 Yet in other states, the courts
have either avoided these questions or, in some cases,
upheld the validity of sodomy legislation, even in its broad-
est applications.4 Thus sodomy prosecutions are not uncom-
mon in some jurisdictions particularly against homosexuals
and, in a few cases, heterosexuals as well.
The current and unsettled status of the law regarding
sexual privacy and the likely future trends can best be
illustrated with reference to several recent court decisions.
In 1982, Michael Hardwick, an Atlanta man was ar-
rested and charged with the crime of sodomy for engaging in
sexual activity with a consenting adult male in the bedroom
of his own home. The charges were never prosecuted, but
Hardwick filed suit in federal court seeking a judicial deter-
mination that the statute under which he had been charged
was unconstitutional. He admitted in his complaint that he
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intended to engage in private homosexual activity. He was
joined in his suit by a married couple. They also claimed they
intended to engage in sexual activity presumably proscribed
by the statute. The penalty under the Georgia statute for
sodomy was a maximum of 20 years in prison.
The federal court rejected the claim of the married
couple, holding that they had no standing to raise their issue,
barring any indication that the statute might be prosecuted
against them. The federal district court held that Hardwick
did have standing to pursue declaratory relief, but dismissed
his complaint on its merits, holding that an earlier decision of
the Supreme Court had implied that sodomy legislation was
constitutional.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
lower court on the constitutional issue. Recognizing that
state legislation infringed on Hardwick's constitutional right
to privacy, the court held that the state legislation must be
held to the demanding judicial test of "strict scrutiny. "5 The
appellate court remanded the case for trial, ". . . at which
time the State must prove in order to prevail that it has a
compelling interest in regulating this behavior and that this
statute is the most narrowly drawn means of safeguarding
that interest."
The prosecutor on behalf of the state however, appealed
the Court of Appeals decision to the US Supreme Court
which to the surprise of many observers accepted-jurisdic-
tion in November 1985. While it is difficult to "read" the
Court's intentions in accepting this particular decision for
review, presumably the Court has some interest in the merits
of the constitutional issue, and by as early as Fall of 1986 the
Court may have clarified the validity of sodomy legislation
such as that in Georgia.
In this regard, the circumstances of Hardwick's original
arrest- in the privacy of his own home- and the breadth
of the statute (the legislation makes criminal any act involv-
ing the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of
another)6 will make the Hardwick decision, should it be
decided by the Supreme Court on its merits, far-reaching,
one way or the other, in its implications.
The "other" approach that the Court may choose to
follow is best illustrated by a decision in the Fifth Circuit
Court ofAppeals decided following the Hardwick decision in
the Eleventh Circuit.
A more recent decision came to the opposite conclu-
sion. Reviewing a similar challenge to the Texas statute
banning "deviate sexual intercourse with another individual
of the same sex," the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the privacy protected by the Constitution does not
extend to homosexual activity, and, therefore, that the state
legislation need only be held to a judicial test of its rational-
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ity. Reversing a lengthy examination of that statute by the
lower federal court that had held the Texas sodomy statute
unconstitutional, the Court of Appeals ruled that "the court
cannot say that the statute is totally unrelated to the pursuit
of implementing morality, a permissible state goal."7
Both opinions made reference to an earlier action of the
Supreme Court in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorneyfor City
of Richmond.8 In that case, the Court summarily upheld
without written opinion the decision of a three judge federal
district court in Virginia that held that the privacy protected
by the federal Constitution only extends to sexual activity
that is an extension of "marriage," "the sanctity of the
home," or of "family life." Since in the court's view neither
a constitutionally protected interest in privacy or any other
fundamental interest was affected by this legislation, the
state need only show a rational connection between this
statute and its legitimate interest in preventing moral delin-
quency.
The precedential value of Richmond outside of Virginia
is not clear. In theory, a summary affirmance of such an
opinion by the Supreme Court can be regarded as tacit
approval of the lower court's reasoning; in practice, how-
ever, such decisions are rarely considered binding prece-
dent, and just as likely an indication that the Court preferred
at that time not to rule directly on the issues involved.
Nonetheless, the decision can be given considerable weight,
particularly by those courts predisposed to agree with the
summary decision's implications.
Both the practical implications of these three decisions
and the underlying constitutional principles at stake are
complex and easily confused by their political and emotional
overtones. Essentially, the courts are required either due
process or equal protection to examine initially whether a
statute infringes on any activity or interest that is fundamen-
tally protected by the Constitution.a That is to say, they must
a) There is an alternative "trigger" to "close scrutiny" under Equal
Protection analysis. Modern courts have also protected more closely the
interests of certain groups that historically have been either effectively
disenfranchised or subjected to overt discrimination. Thus where the courts
find a racial classification, a classification based on alienage or national origin,
or, in a few cases, a classification based directly on income, the courts have
found a "suspect classification" and therefore have scrutinized more closely
the legislative discrimination as it would if a fundamental interest were at
stake. See, e.g., San Antonio School District v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972);
see also K. Wing, The Law and the Public's Health (2d Ed. 1985) at 101-12.
Although the current Supreme Court has evidenced an intent to narrow the
definition of suspect classifications, at least in the case of legislation intended
to prevent sexual activity of homosexuals, suspect classification analysis
would seem an appropriate trigger for more rigorous judicial scrutiny even if
a fundamental interest were not involved. The likelihood of any court doing
so, howev*r, is quite small.
As raised by these cases, the right to privacy is essentially a right "to be left
alone," or better put, a right "to be left alone" unless government has a
sufficiently compelling interest. Some courts may also consider that this same
"interest" is also implicit in the "liberty" protected by the Constitution.
Conceptually, the interests in the "liberty" and "privacy" are difficult to
distinguish, particularly since the evolution of an explicitly recognized "right
to privacy" relied at least in part on the constitutional protection of "liberty"
in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152
(1973). In prior judicial reviews of various state attempts to impose public
health measures that antedated the recognition of a separate "right to
privacy", the Supreme Court characterized the individual interest to be free
from state interference with private conduct as a "liberty" interest (See, e.g.,
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200
(1927). Yet those same cases, argued today, would likely be characterized as
considering the individual's interest in "privacy" rather than "liberty." See
K. Wing, The Law and the Public's Health (2d Ed. 1985) at 25. But regardless
of how the interest is characterized in cases involving regulation of sexual
conduct, the notion that the individual has a right "to be left alone" could be
regarded as a fundamental protected interest and where affected would
require the enhanced judicial protection of close scrutiny. Viewing a "right to
initially ask whether an interest or activity is both fundamen-
tally important and protected by the Constitution. If the
interest or activity is "fundamental," and sufficiently bur-
dened by the statutory scheme, the courts will adopt a more
active posture and closely scrutinize both the alleged gov-
ernmental justification and the method by which that justifi-
cation is protected by the legislation. Only where the justi-
fication is sufficiently important and it appears to the court
that no less invasive means for achieving that governmental
interest exists, can a fundamental interest be affected or
burdened. For example, as indicated by the 1983 abortion
cases, even where a state has a "compelling interest" in
protecting immature minors, the Supreme Court still ruled
that any state regulation of their consent to abortions must
not be so over broad as to excessively burden the privacy
rights of mature minors.9 Also, in the earlier 1973 decisions,
the Court recognized that a state may have a "compelling
interest" in protecting maternal-health, but only where that
health interest can be documented can the conditions under
which abortions be performed be regulated (e.g., a state can
limit abortions to certain settings where medical evidence
indicates that abortions outside of those settings are more
risky than childbirth).'0 "Close scrutiny" effectively re-
quires the government to demonstrate that there is a valid
purpose served by challenged legislation and that the pur-
pose is being served. Understandably, few statutes survive
close scrutiny.
On the other hand, where legislation is found not to
impact on a ""fundamental interest," the court's role is
limited to a test of rationality, a judicial finding that there is
some valid (not necessarily "compelling") state interest
served that has some rational connection to the statutory
prohibition.
The difference between mere rationality and the test of
close scrutiny is being reflected in the rhetoric of the Fifth
Circuit in Baker: ". . . the court cannot say that the statute
is totally unrel4ted to the pursuit of . .. a permissible state
goal." Such rhetoric suggests that the legislatures have
nearly unlimited discretion in fashioning legislation,
bounded only by their belief that their ends are legitimate
and that the statutory scheme will serve those ends.
The essential difference between these contrasting judi-
cial postures may be most acute where the state's legislative
justification is protection or promotion of morality. Except
be left alone" as part of an interest in liberty would, however, have
considerable relevance if the right to privacy were in the future significantly
narrowed, e.g., to apply only to married couples.
To make matters even more conceptually complicated, it is also possible to
view the individual's interest in liberty as incorporating an interest in being
free from physical restraint. Indeed, if the individual's "right to be left alone,"
expressed either as a privacy or as a liberty interest, is a fundamentally
protected interest requiring close judicial protection, it would seem only
common sense that the right to be physically free would be a priori a
fundamental interest. Thus where criminal legislation imposes incarceration
as a penalty, or civil legislation leads to involuntary confinement, the courts
could closely scrutinize the legislative scheme to protect the liberty interest of
the confined person. But, again the courts have not been entirely clear or
consistent, particularly in regard to civil commitment. In some contexts, the
courts have examined legislation that imposes criminal sanctions rather
closely, striking down legislation that is vague, overly broad, or inconsistent,
suggesting that the judicial protection of the liberty at stake when criminal
sanctions are imposed requires enhanced judicial protection. But, in general,
criminal statutes have not been "closely scrutinized"-at least that rhetoric
has not been used. More critically, in the various cases discussing criminal
sodomy statutes, even those examining statutes where harsh criminal penal-
ties are imposed, apparently courts have not considered the liberty interest in
freedom from restraint as a "trigger" to close scrutiny of these legislative
schemes.
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perhaps for pornography,b in which protection of minors is
central, there is virtually no circumstance under which a
modem court has allowed a statutory scheme premised only
on promoting or protecting morality to survive close scru-
tiny, at least where the moral justification is aimed at
prohibiting the activity which is constitutionally protected.
In contrast, under the test of rationality, the courts have
allowed a variety of legislative schemes to be held constitu-
tional, even where the state merely asserts that it is promot-
ing a moral principle and the connection between the statute
and that purpose is neither apparent nor examined. More
simply put, promoting morality may be a legitimate state
purpose under a test of rationality, but a state interest in
prohibiting an activity that is protected by the Constitution
on the grounds that the legislature thinks that such an
activity is immoral is not "compelling" and therefore not
constitutional.
While the rhetoric of close scrutiny and rationality
analysis may appear to border on constitutional gibberish,
the implications of such rhetoric are clear and important. At
stake here are no less than the essential questions of gov-
ernment power: how far can the state legislatures, presum-
ably representing the views of the majority, regulate the
activities of individual citizens? What role do the courts have
in protecting individuals from that majority, particularly
when the individual is engaged in activities that are unpop-
ular or "different" or at odds with the majority's value
system? The short answer, somewhat at odds with popular
notions of freedom and privacy, to a complicated question is
that only where courts find that the individual's activity is
protected by either the letter or the clear implication of one
or more of the various provisions of the federal Constitution
will the courts take more than a cursory review of the
underlying "justness" or wisdom of legislation. Moreover,
even where the activity is constitutionally protected, courts
may scrutinize closely the claimed justification of the state
but the legislation may still be held valid if the court finds
that justification sufficiently "compelling."
Thus the initial issue of whether the state regulation of
sexual activity impacts on the constitutional right of privacy
or some other protected interest is crucial, although not
absolutely determinative, to the outcome ofany examination
of a statute's validity. And, as the cases discussed have
indicated, a number of courts have taken a very conservative
view of the constitutional right to privacy and its application
to sodomy legislation. In most other jurisdictions the consti-
tutional protection of sexual privacy is very much an open
question. Only in a relatively few jurisdictions, popular
notions notwithstanding, has the judicial protection of pri-
vacy been extended to all consensual sexual acts among
adults, or to the privacy of the home or even to all private
relations between married couples.
b) It should be noted that the pornography decisions deserve separate
analysis. First of all, the courts' protection of the First Amendment has
paralleled the protection of other "fundamental interests" but has involved a
distinct analysis by the courts that at least suggests that the First Amendment
deserves special judicial protection. Second, while clearly relevant to the
cases discussed in this article, it is also clear that the interest of the state in
preventing the distribution of pornography is usually justified by the state's
interest in preventing undesired public exposure of pornography, or the
protection of minors, or protection of other thirdparty interests, not the moral
purpose of prohibiting the private use or possession of pornography per se.
Similarly, it is important to distinguish the analysis of sodomy legislation as
applied to private activity among consenting adults from statutory prohibi-
tions that are intended to prevent assault or coercion in sexual activity,
protection of minors, or protection of other third parties.
In anticipating future decisions, one political fact seems
too important to ignore: the implications of judicially con-
servative interpretations of the Constitution have not been
lost on the Reagan Administration. The Administration in its
efforts to carry out its New Right agenda in domestic affairs
has been obsessively seeking out judicial appointments to
the federal courts that will uphold judicially conservative
ideals and, particularly, narrowly drawn notions of the scope
of protection of individual privacy. President Reagan has
appointed only one Justice to the Supreme Court; but by the
end of his second term, he may have appointed over half of
the federal court judges in the country, and the fallout from
those appointments will become more visible in cases in-
volving sexual privacy.c
There also is the obvious relevance of AIDS. Public fear
of the spread of AIDS (acquired immune deficiency syn-
drome) is certain to inspire a variety of attempts to legislate
restrictions on homosexual and perhaps other sexual activ-
ity, as well as increased prosecution under existing legisla-
tion. The spread of AIDS will also have considerable rele-
vance in the interpretation of constitutional principles.
It must be assumed that any court reviewing legislation
under the limited review of rationality, as some courts
appear prepared to do, will uphold legislation that has any
arguable connection to the spread of an infectious disease;
consequently, such courts will tolerate even the most ex-
treme measures as "what the court cannot say is totally
unrelated to the pursuit of a permissible state goal."
On the other hand, where courts are willing to submit to
close scrutiny legislative regulation of sexual conduct, for
the purpose of controlling the spread of AIDS, the outcome
is more difficult to predict. Preventing the spread of a
contagious disease is a compelling state purpose; but the real
issue is whether, under the enhanced judicial protection of
close scrutiny, the particular legislative scheme serves that
purpose without interfering too greatly with the exercise of
the fundamental rights of the individuals subject to the
legislation, and does so in the least restrictive manner to
meet the state's goal.
One would expect, for instance, that sodomy statutes
imposing criminal penalties on all homosexual conduct
would stillbe considered unconstitutional since such blanket
prohibitions could be more narrowly targeted and the statu-
tory purpose achieved with less drastic impact on individual
rights. On the other hand, compulsory treatment or even
quarantine of known carriers of AIDS who continue to
engage in homosexual activity, much like the commitment of
the tuberculin patients in decades past, may well be viewed
as the least drastic means for achieving a compelling gov-
ernmental interest despite its impact on the individual.
A more difficult question would be raised by a statutory
scheme of compulsory examination of certain categories of
people likely to be exposed to the disease. The constitution-
ality of such a scheme could well depend upon the courts'
evaluation of the state of scientific knowledge regarding the
disease, its etiology, and its prevention; indeed, the work of
public health professionals may well be the crucial factor in
c) For example, in a case similar to Baker, Justice Bork, currently of the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, but considered by many to be
a leading candidate for Reagan's next appointment to the Supreme Court, has
taken an extremely narrow and extremely critical view of the Supreme
Court's protection of private activity, even suggesting that the current Court's
recognition of a constitutional right to privacy borders on illegitimacy.
Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984); reh'g en banc denied,
746 F.2d 1579 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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reviewing the constitutionality of various legislative at-
tempts to prevent or control AIDS.
There is a broader lesson here: the protection of civil
liberties, popularly regarded as the province of the courts, is
only a judicial function in a limited sense. Legislative dis-
cretion under our constitutional system is extensive and in
some cases virtually unlimited. In the general sense, such
principles are intended to protect the rule of democratically
elected officials. In specific cases, however, it insulates the
rule of a majority, even the rule of a vocal or powerful
minority.
In the abortion funding decisions several years ago,
Justice Powell concluded his analysis of the government
discretion to prohibit the public financing of abortions, and
his dismissal of claims that such discretion was unconstitu-
tional, by quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes: "We should not
forget that 'legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties
and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as the
courts.' " As the court decisions regarding sexual privacy
unfold in the next few years, we will be rather acutely
reminded of this constitutional fact, although probably with
a somewhat different reaction than Justice Powell apparently
intended us to have.
Is there a right to privacy in the United States that
protects the marital relationship? Is there an area of private
conduct within the confines of an adult's residence that is
free from governmental regulation? Do we have, as many
believe, a right to be left alone, at least in our most intimate
relationships, that at least requires the government to justify
to the courts its regulation of sexual and other private
activities? In some jurisdictions, the answer is "no" to each
of these questions. Rights of sexual privacy, at least to the
New Right politicians and some conservative jurists, may
exist only at the discretion of prevailing political sentiments.
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